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Abstract. Private handshaking allows pairs of users to determine which
(secret) groups they are both a member of. Group membership is kept
secret to everybody else. Private handshaking is a more private form of
secret handshaking [BDS+03], because it does not allow the group ad-
ministrator to trace users. We extend the original definition of a hand-
shaking protocol to allow and test for membership of multiple groups
simultaneously. We present simple and efficient protocols for both the
single group and multiple group membership case.
Private handshaking is a useful tool for mutual authentication, demanded
by many pervasive applications (including RFID) for privacy. Our im-
plementations are efficient enough to support such usually resource con-
strained scenarios.
1 Introduction
A secret handshake allows members of a (secret) group to identify each other,
without revealing their membership to potential eavesdroppers or malicious im-
postors. As an informal example taken from the real world, it would allow FBI
agents attending a hacker convention to recognise each other without giving
away their presence to the rest of the audience1.
Several years ago, Balfanz et al. [BDS+03] revived interest (e.g., [CJT05])
in the development of secure (cryptographic) protocols to implement such secret
handshakes. According to them, secret handshakes are fundamentally different
from one-way accumulators [BM93] and private matchmaking [BG85, Mea86,
ZN] (not to be confused with distributed match making [MV88]). We show that
⋆ This research was partially funded by Sentinels project JASON (NIT.6677).
Id: secret-handshakes.tex 17 2008-03-31 21:45:57Z jhh .
1 This, off course, is not withstanding the use of any other distinctive features to ’spot’
a typical FBI agent. Moreover, in this scenario, where all people present belong
essentially to just two groups, non-membership of one group ‘proves’ membership of
the other. . .
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this distinction is only superficial (depending on a particular notion of traitor
tracing), and that much simpler protocols, derived from the literature on match-
making (and pretty much equivalent to one-way accumulators) serve equally well
as secret handshake protocols. We call these protocols private handshaking pro-
tocols.
Such private handshaking protocols (that, unlike secret handshaking, do not
implement traceability) are quite suitable to resource constrained environments,
like low-end smart card, RFID or NFC-based2 systems [RE03, Fin03]. Moreover,
they implement a form of mutual authentication that is sorely needed in many
pervasive systems [WSRE03, HHJ+06]. For instance, the privacy of a holder of
an RFID tag is better protected if the reader must authenticate to the tag before
the tag releases any information. A private handshaking protocol could ensure
that the tag would only grant access if the reader and the tag belong to the same
group.
1.1 State of the art
Private matchmaking protocols, originally studied by Baldwin and Gramlich [BG85]
(and followed up upon by Zhang and Needham [ZN]), allow users that share
the same ‘wish’ to locate and identify each other securely and privately. The
canonical example used in both papers is that of matching job openings at big
corporations with high-ranked managers looking for their next job opportunity.
In this example a corporation will not want to publicly announce availability of
a position, and similarly, a high-ranked manager will not want to reveal his or
her job aspirations to everybody. The protocol of Baldwin and Gramlich [BG85]
requires the presence of an on-line trusted third party. Zhang and Needham [ZN]
improve on this by not using a trusted third party at all, and not using public-key
cryptography either (making their protocol very light-weight).
Secret handshaking protocols, as studied by Balfanz et al. [BDS+03] consider
membership of a secret group instead, and allow members of such groups to reli-
ably identify fellow group members without giving away their group membership
to non-members and eavesdroppers. An example of this problem was given in the
introduction. Balfanz et al. also pose the additional requirement that a group
member can choose to authenticate to other group members that have a certain
role within that group. Furthermore, they require that group membership is re-
vocable, and that the protocols are forward repudiable, traceable and collusion
resistant (see section 2.2 for details). Their protocols are secure under the Bi-
linear Diffie-Hellman assumption [BF01] and the random oracle model [BR93b].
They require that each user periodically obtains fresh pseudonyms from the
group administrator, for use in a handshake protocol run.
Their results were later improved by Castelluccia et al. [CJT05] with pro-
tocols based on CA-Oblivious encryption secure under the random oracle model
2 RFID stands for Radio Frequency IDentification. NFC stands for Near Field Com-
munication. See the references for more information.
Private Handshakes 3
and either the Computational Diffie Hellman assumption or the RSA assump-
tion [MOV96]. Like Balfanz et al. , unlinkability in their protocols is achieved at
the cost of an ample supply of fresh pseudonyms used one by one in every proto-
col run. Also, both protocols assume the existence of a group administrator that
distributes group secrets to group members, and that can discover any traitors.
Unfortunately, this also implies that the administrator can discover all instances
of a protocol run in which a particular user participated3. This is clearly a strong
breach of privacy.
Tsudik and Xu [TX05] extend the secret handshaking problem to more than
2 participants (but still determining shared membership of a single group), and
present protocols solving this generalisation with reusable credentials. This re-
moves the main drawback found in previous protocols. Xu and Yung [XY04]
previously achieved a similar reusability of credentials.
Meadows [Mea86] built a matchmaking protocol without relying on an on-line
trusted third party (but using public key cryptography, cf. [ZN]). Interestingly,
she studied the matchmaking problem in the secret handshake setting: i.e., she
considered secret group membership instead of communicating wishes. The dif-
ference between both is subtle, but important (see [BDS+03]): if the wish can be
guessed, then (by definition of the matchmaking problem that any pair of users
sharing the same wish can identify each other) the owner of that wish can be
identified. Similarly, if ‘secret’ group names are used as input to matchmaking
protocols, then anybody able to guess the group name can locate the other, real,
group members, and moreover can impersonate a group member.
In a similar vain, set intersection protocols [FNP04, KS05] are subtly different
from private handshaking protocols as well. Typically, the domains of the sets
over which the intersection has to be computed is much smaller, and in any
case, any element in the domain is a possible member. For private handshaking
protocols, however, group membership is encoded by a secret value from a much
larger, sparsely occupied, domain. Moreover, not all set intersection protocols
require the outcome of the computation to be secret. A more thorough discussion
of the relationship between secret handshaking, oblivious encryption/signatures
and hidden credentials can be found in [Hol05].
1.2 Our results
We define the private handshaking problem as a more private form of secret
handshaking [BDS+03], that does not allow a group administrator (or anyone
else) to trace users running the protocol. This makes private handshaking a more
private form of secret handshaking. Our model and definitions are described
in Sect. 2. The main contribution of this paper is the conclusion that, when
3 In the current implementations of these protocols, this is trivial because the parties
exchange pseudonyms initially distributed by the group administrator. More fun-
damentally, this could be achieved in full generality by running the traitor tracing
protocol on a normal protocol run. By definition, this this would reveal the parties
involved (provided they were members of the group).
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dropping traceability, much more efficient implementations of handshaking are
possible. This makes such protocols viable for resource constrained environments,
like RFID or NFC-based systems.
We extend the definition of handshake protocols to handle the (much more
common) case where people are members of several groups. Using existing,
single-group, handshaking protocols Alice and Bob (member of a and b groups
respectively) can do no better than running a×b handshake protocols in parallel
to determine all the groups that they share membership of. We show that, in
fact, O(a+ b) type protocols exist.
We then present two protocols for private handshaking, one for the case
where Alice and Bob are members of a single group (Sect. 3), and another
where Alice and Bob are a member of any number of groups each (Sect. 4).
Both use a single Diffie-Hellman key exchange [DH76] and exchange as many
hashes as the largest number of allowed group membership per user4. Security of
the protocols relies on the Diffie-Hellman assumption [MOV96] and the random
oracle assumption [BR93b].
2 Model and notation
2.1 System and adversary model
We assume a distributed system of n nodes, connected by asynchronous message
passing. Nodes can be members of zero, one or more groups G ∈ G. There are
m different groups. We write i ∈ G if node i belongs to group G, and Gi for the
set of all groups to which node i belongs. We assume group membership is fixed
and part of the initialisation of the system. We will discuss the ramifications of
this assumption later on in Sect. 5.
The system is controlled by a Dolev and Yao [DY81] style adversary A that
may block, delay, relay, delete, insert or modify messages. This allows him to
force nodes to participate in a protocol run together with other nodes specified
by the adversary5. The adversary may also corrupt any number of nodes in
the system, read all data stored by such nodes, and participate in protocol runs
“being within” such nodes. Nodes and the adversary are modelled as probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machines. We write A ∈ G if the adversary corrupted
a member of group G, and GA for the set of all groups for which the adversary
corrupted a node. If a node i is corrupted we write i ∈ A. In this case Gi is
assumed to be a subset of GA. Uncorrupted nodes are honest.
In other words, the adversary induces a sequence of message exchanges and
protocol steps called a run. At the start of each run, all nodes are initialised.
4 Balfanz et al. [BDS+03] argue that a Diffie-Hellman key exchange cannot be used to
implement secret handshaking. Their argument however depends on the requirement
that individual members of a group need to be traceable, and hence does not apply
to private handshaking protocols.
5 Bellare et al. [BR93a, BPR00] model the same adversarial power by allowing the
adversary to query an infinite supply of protocol oracles.
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In this phase, nodes may be given long term secret data needed to securely run
the protocol. However, the adversary may subvert any number of nodes and
retrieve this secret information stored by them. Finally, the adversary may force
any node to reveal any secret information resulting from a particular protocol
exchange. Typically, this involves a session key established by the protocol.
2.2 The private handshake problem
We have the following set of requirements (cf. [BDS+03, TX05]) for a private
handshake protocol run between two nodes i and j, belonging to groups Gi and
Gj that returns output Oi to i and Oj to j. All statements below hold with
overwhelming probability, for arbitrary adversary A, for an arbitrary group G
and nodes i, j.
correctness/safety Oi,Oj ⊆ Gi ∩ Gj .
progress If i and j are honest and all messages exchanged between them during
the run are delivered unaltered, Oi = Oj = Gi ∩ Gj .
resistance to detection Let j ∈ A but A /∈ G. Then the adversary A cannot
distinguish a protocol run in which it interacts with a node i ∈ G from a run
involving a simulator6.
indistinguishability to eavesdroppers Let i, j /∈ A. Then the adversary A
cannot determine whether i ∈ G or i /∈ G. This holds even if A ∈ G. Note
that both participants in the run need to be uncorrupted, and that the
adversary does not modify7 messages exchanged between i and j.
unlinkability Adversary A is unable to distinguish a protocol run involving
node i from a protocol run involving a node j 6= i with Gj = Gi, even when
GA = Gi and A participates in the protocol runs
8.
forward repudiability After the run, node i cannot convince another node k
whether j ∈ G or not. In other words, a run between i and j is indistinguish-
able from a run between i and i, for anyone except i.
Traditionally, the following two requirements are listed as well.
resistance to impersonation Let j ∈ A but A /∈ G. Then the adversary is
not able to convince a node i ∈ G that A ∈ G.
non traceability The group administrator of group G is unable to link two
different protocol runs involving the same node i ∈ G.
6 Note how this requirement subtly circumvents the problem that the adversary does
learn non-membership of i of the groups it is itself a member of (by corruption or
otherwise).
7 The powers of the adversary are limited to eavesdropping in this case. Clearly, an
active adversary belonging to the same group as i can stage a man-in-the-middle
attack and determine membership of G for i just like a legitimate node j could.
8 The statement of this requirement is a bit involved because technically, an adversary
can distinguish different nodes from the groups they are a member of, if the adversary
itself is a member of those groups and if it participates in the runs. Intuitively, the
requirement simply says that protocol runs do not carry node identifiers or similar.
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However, resistance to impersonation is actually implied by correctness and the
definition of Gi when i is corrupted. And non-traceability is equivalent to un-
linkability if the group administrator is missing (or considered to be a normal,
corruptible, node). We therefore omit these requirements from the list.
We refrain from imposing a fairness requirement (cf. [BDS+03]) which would
require Oi = Oj always. Fairness can be guaranteed, but at the expense of
running a complex fair exchange type protocol.
Similarly, we do not require the protocol participants to set up a shared
session key to be used whenever mutual authentication was successful. The pro-
tocols we present, however, do establish such a shared key.
Finally, we note that Meadows [Mea86] stipulates that an adversary that
has stolen a secret from a group member cannot find out membership of the
someone else without at least revealing group membership. This is similar to the
resistance to impersonation requirement, when fairness is guaranteed. Otherwise,
it will only hold when the adversary initiates the handshake.
3 Single membership protocols
We first present a protocol to determine shared membership of a single group.
This protocol is basically a Diffie Hellman key exchange using a secret generator s
as the group secret, and using the key validation phase as group membership test.
The validated key can be discarded or used for secure communication between
the authenticated parties. In fact, the protocol is very similar to SPEKE [Jab96],
and Meadows [Mea86] basic protocol idea (but without exchanging the secret
session key in the clear, instead using a key verification round as in [BPR00]).
3.1 Security proof
The following lemmas prove that protocol 1 implements private handshaking.
We only sketch the proofs. Consider an arbitrary run between two nodes i and
j, belonging to groups Gi = {Ga} and Gj = {Gb} where i returns output Oi
and j returns output Oj . Let A be an arbitrary adversary, and let G be an
arbitrary group. A property holds with overwhelming probability if it holds with
probability larger than 1−1/2σ, where σ is the security parameter. It holds with
negligible probability if the probability is less than 1/2σ.
Lemma 3.1 (correctness/safety). Oi,Oj ⊆ Gi ∩Gj with overwhelming prob-
ability.
Proof. Clearly the protocol ensures Oi ⊆ Gi. We have Ga ∈ Oi when h5(u
x) =
h5(v
y). This happens only, with overwhelming probability, when ux = vy, in
other words (syb )
x = (sxa)
y. This holds only with overwhelming probability when
sa = sb. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.2 (progress). If i and j are honest and all messages exchanged
between them during the run are delivered unaltered, then Oi = Oj = Gi ∩ Gj.
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Alice Bob
group Ga group Gb
group secret sa group secret sb
(or random if none) (or random if none)
Exchange
pick random x pick random y
(sa)
x
−−−−−−−→ receive v
receive u
(sb)
y
←−−−−−−−
Key validation
h4(u
x)
−−−−−−−−→ receive m
if m = h4(v
y)
then Ob = {Gb}
else Ob = ∅
receive m′
h5(v
y)
←−−−−−−−−
if m′ = h5(u
x)
then Oa = {Ga}
else Oa = ∅
k := h3(u
x) k := h3(v
y)
Fig. 1. Message flow of the single membership private handshaking protocol.
Proof. This is easily verified by case analysis. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.3 (resistance to detection). Let j ∈ A but A /∈ G. Then the
adversary A cannot distinguish a protocol run in which it interacts with a node
i ∈ G from a run involving a simulator with non-negligible probability.
Proof. The adversary has to distinguish sxa from g
z given fx for f known to the
adversary, where x is fresh, random and unknown to the adversary. Moreover, sa
is unknown to the adversary (but it may know many sya, for fresh and unknown
y, from previous protocol runs). Distinguishing this would violate the Diffie-
Hellman assumption. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.4 (indistinguishability to eavesdroppers). Let i, j /∈ A. Then
the adversary A cannot determine whether i ∈ G or i /∈ G with non-negligible
probability. This holds even if A ∈ G.
Proof. Similar to the proof of the previous lemma. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3.5 (unlinkability). Adversary A is unable to distinguish a protocol
run involving node i from a protocol run involving a node j 6= i with Gj = Gi,
even when GA = Gi and A participates in the protocol runs.
Proof. Nodes i and j share the same state. Hence all messages sent by i could
have been sent by j as well. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 3.6 (forward repudiability). After the run, node i cannot convince
another node k whether j ∈ G or not.
Proof. Because i is a member of G, it can construct a valid protocol run between
i and j all by himself, without j participating at all. ⊓⊔
4 Arbitrary membership protocols
It is possible to use the single membership protocol to determine all groups of
which both Alice and Bob are a member, by running the previous protocol for
all candidate pairs separately. However, if Alice is a member of a groups and
Bob is a member of b groups, this requires a× b message exchanges (and more if
the number of groups one is a member of should not be revealed). In this section
we describe a more efficient protocol (see Protocol 2), which does not provide
traitor tracing.
Suppose each user can be a member of at most m groups. Each group is
identified by a group secret (which, essentially, is a random value). Each user
A that is a member of a group stores its group secret in an array sA[]. Any
remaining cells in the array are filled with random values (not corresponding to
groups). The array is randomly permuted after initialisation9. After establishing
a shared secret session key k using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, Alice and Bob
exchange keyed hashes hk and h
′
k of each group secret. Real implementations
should use HMAC [BCK96]. Alice stores the hashes it receives in a set HB, looks
for entries in sA[] whose hash occurs in HB, and adds those as common group
members to GA.
Note that Alice needs to use a hash function different from the one used
by Bob, in order to avoid detection of shared membership by eavesdroppers. If
Alice wishes not to reveal membership of certain groups, she can replace the
corresponding group secret with a random value. However, Bob cannot avoid re-
vealing his membership of those groups (unless he decides to do so independently
from Alice).
4.1 Security proof
The following lemmas prove that protocol 2 implements private handshaking
for multiple group. We sketch the proofs of the lemmas. Consider an arbitrary
run between two nodes i and j, belonging to groups Gi and Gj where i returns
output Oi and j returns output Oj (where we treat the group secrets si[x] to
represent their respective groups). Let A be an arbitrary adversary, and let G be
an arbitrary group. A property holds with overwhelming probability if it holds
with probability larger than 1−1/2σ, where σ is the security parameter. It holds
with negligible probability if the probability is less than 1/2σ.
9 If not, Bob might be able to infer the number of groups of which Alice is a member
from the fact that the x-th token happens to coincide with a group he himself is a
member of.
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Alice Bob
generator g generator g
group secrets sa[1, . . . ,m] group secrets sb[1, . . . , m]
(randomly permuted) (randomly permuted)
Exchange
pick random x pick random y
gx
−−−−−→ receive v
receive u
gy
←−−−−−
k := h(ux) k := h(vy)
Group membership
hk(sa[0]),...,hk(sa[m])−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ receive into Ha
receive into Hb
h′k(sb[0]),...,h
′
k(sb[m])←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Oa = {sa[i] | h
′
k(sa[i]) ∈ Hb} Ob = {sb[i] | hk(sb[i]) ∈ Ha}
Fig. 2. Message flow of the generalised private handshaking protocol.
Lemma 4.1 (correctness/safety). Oi,Oj ⊆ Gi ∩Gj with overwhelming prob-
ability.
Proof. Clearly Oi ⊆ Gi. If x ∈ Oi then also h
′
k[x] ∈ Hj . Hence h
′
k(x) = z for
some z received in the second phase of the protocol. If z is not sent by j, then
k is unknown to the adversary. Hence the chances that h′k(x) = z are negligible.
If z is sent by j then z = h′k(sj [y]) for some y. This happens with overwhelming
probability if x = sj [y] and hence x ∈ Gj . ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.2 (progress). If i and j are honest and all messages exchanged
between them during the run are delivered unaltered, then Oi = Oj = Gi ∩ Gj.
Proof. This is easily verified by case analysis. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.3 (resistance to detection). Let j ∈ A but A /∈ G. Then the
adversary A cannot distinguish a protocol run in which it interacts with a node
i ∈ G from a run involving a simulator with non-negligible probability.
Proof. Since j ∈ A, the adversary does know the shared session key k derived
using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. However, since A /∈ G, it does not know
the secret si[x] for group G. Hence it cannot tell whether hk(si[x]) and hk′(si[x])
are hashes for the same group exchanged during different sessions, or if these
hashes correspond to different groups. This holds even if the adversary knows k′
for the other session as well. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.4 (indistinguishability to eavesdroppers). Let i, j /∈ A. Then
the adversary A cannot determine whether i ∈ G or i /∈ G with non-negligible
probability. This holds even if A ∈ G.
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Proof. If i, j /∈ A, then the adversary does not know the shared session key k
derived using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. With a fresh, unknown, random
key k, the keyed hash value hk(si[x]) corresponding to the secret for group G is
indistinguishable from a random value, even if the adversary knows si[x]. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.5 (unlinkability). Adversary A is unable to distinguish a protocol
run involving node i from a protocol run involving a node j 6= i with Gj = Gi,
even when GA = Gi and A participates in the protocol runs.
Proof. Nodes i and j share the same state. Hence all messages sent by i could
have been sent by j as well. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.6 (forward repudiability). After the run, node i cannot convince
another node k whether j ∈ G or not.
Proof. Because i is a member of G, it can construct a valid protocol run between
i and j all by himself, without j participating at all. ⊓⊔
5 Conclusions
We have presented two efficient protocols for secret handshaking. The second
protocol efficiently supports membership of more than one group. The focus in
this work is the efficiency of the protocols. They use only a few, quite simple,
operations. This may allow the implementation of these protocols on resource
constrained devices, like perhaps higher-end RFID tags. It is especially in these
kinds of environments that a form of mutual authentication is required to provide
a certain level of security and/or privacy.
Our protocols do not allow for easy revocation of group membership: all
remaining members need to be given a new, fresh, group secret. More efficient
ways to support group membership revocation are an interesting topic for further
research, especially given the requirement that the resulting protocols should still
be efficient and should not allow a group adminstrator to trace users. We also
wish to develop more formal proofs for the security of our protocols.
Two other possible extensions of the basic pairwise private handshake are
left for further investigation. First of all, one could consider a private group
handshake where a subgroup of a secret group can recognise membership of
the same group simultaneously (e.g., when setting up a meeting). Secondly, one
could create password based private handshakes by using the original idea of
Jablon [Jab96] based on a passkey shared by the members of the group.
We thank Flavio D. Garcia, David Galindo and Berry Schoenmakers for fruit-
ful discussions on this topic, and the anonymous referees for their very insightful
comments and suggestions.
References
[BG85] Baldwin, R. W., and Gramlich, W. C. Cryptographic protocol for
trustable match making. In IEEE Security & Privacy (Oakland, CA,
USA, 1985), IEEE, pp. 92–100.
Private Handshakes 11
[BDS+03] Balfanz, D., Durfee, G., Shankar, N., Smetters, D. K., Staddon,
J., and Wong, H. C. Secret handshakes from pairing-based key agree-
ments. In IEEE Security & Privacy (Oakland, CA, USA, 2003), IEEE,
pp. 180–196.
[BCK96] Bellare, M., Canetti, R., and Krawczyk, H. Keying hash functions
for message authentication. In CRYPTO ’96 (Santa Barbara, CA, USA,
1996), N. Koblitz (Ed.), LNCS 1109, Springer, pp. 1–15.
[BPR00] Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., and Rogaway, P. Authenticated
key exchange secure against dictionary attacks. In EUROCRYPT 2000
(Bruges, Belgium, 2000), B. Preneel (Ed.), LNCS 1807, Springer, pp. 139–
155.
[BR93a] Bellare, M., and Rogaway, P. Entity authentication and key distri-
bution. In CRYPTO ’93 (Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 1993), D. R. Stinson
(Ed.), LNCS 773, Springer, pp. 232–249.
[BR93b] Bellare, M., and Rogaway, P. Random oracles are practical: A
paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In 1st CCS (Fairfax, VA, USA,
1993), ACM, pp. 62–73.
[BM93] Benaloh, J., and Mare, M. de. One-way accumulators: A decentralized
alternative to digital signatures. In EUROCRYPT ’93 (Lofthus, Norway,
1993), T. Helleseth (Ed.), LNCS 765, Springer, pp. 274–285.
[BF01] Boneh, D., and Franklin, M. Identity-based encryption from the weil
pairing. In CRYPTO 2001 (Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 2001), J. Kilian
(Ed.), LNCS 2139, Springer, pp. 213–229.
[CJT05] Castelluccia, C., Jarecki, S., and Tsudik, G. Secret handshakes
from ca-oblivious encryption. In 10th ASIACRYPT (Jeju Island, Korea,
2005), P. Lee (Ed.), pp. 293–307.
[DH76] Diffie, W., and Hellman, M. E. New directions in cryptography. IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory IT-11 (1976), 644–654.
[DY81] Dolev, D., and Yao, A. On the security of public-key protocols. In 22nd
FOCS (Nashville, TN, USA, 1981), IEEE Comp. Soc. Press, pp. 350–357.
[Fin03] Finkenzeller, K. RFID-Handbook, 2nd ed. Wiley & Sons, 2003.
[FNP04] Freedman, M., Nissim, K., and Pinkas, B. Efficient private match-
ing and set intersection. In EUROCRYPT 2004 (Interlaken, Switzerland,
2004), C. Cachin and J. Camenisch (Eds.), LNCS 3027, Springer, pp. 1–19.
[HHJ+06] Hoepman, J.-H., Hubbers, E., Jacobs, B., Oostdijk, M., and Wich-
ers Schreur, R. Crossing borders: Security and privacy issues of the
european e-passport. In 1st IWSEC (Kyoto, Japan, 2006), H. Yoshiura,
K. Sakurai, K. Rannenberg, Y. Murayama, and S. Kawamura (Eds.),
LNCS 4266, Springer, pp. 152–167.
[Hol05] Holt, J. E. Reconciling ca-oblivious encryption, hidden credentials, osbe
and secret handshakes. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2005/215, 2005.
http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[Jab96] Jablon, D. P. Strong password-only authenticated key exchange.
Comput. Comm. Rev. (1996). www.integritysciences.com and
http://www.std.com/~dpj.
[KS05] Kissner, L., and Song, D. Privacy-preserving set operations. In
CRYPTO 2005 (Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 2005), V. Shoup (Ed.), LNCS
3612, Springer, pp. 241–257.
[Mea86] Meadows, C. A more efficient cryptographic matchmaking protocol for
use in the absence of a continuously available third party. In IEEE Security
& Privacy (Oakland, CA, USA, 1986), IEEE, pp. 134–137.
12 Jaap-Henk Hoepman
[MOV96] Menezes, A. J., Oorschot, P. C. van, and Vanstone, S. A. Handbook
of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996.
[MV88] Mullender, S. J., and Vita´nyi, P. M. B. Distributed match-making.
Algorithmica 3 (1988), 367–391.
[RE03] Rankl, W., and Effing, W. Smart Card Handbook, 3rd ed. Wiley &
Sons, 2003.
[TX05] Tsudik, G., and Xu, S. Flexible framework for secret handshakes (multi-
party anonymous and un-observable authentication). Cryptology ePrint
Archive, Report 2005/034, 2005. http://eprint.iacr.org/.
[WSRE03] Weis, S. A., Sarma, S. E., Rivest, R. L., and Engels, D. W. Security
and privacy aspects of low-cost radio frequency identification systems. In
1st SPC (Boppard, Germany, 2003), D. Hutter, G. Mu¨ller, W. Stephan,
and M. Ullmann (Eds.), LNCS 2802, Springer, pp. 201–212.
[XY04] Xu, S., and Yung, M. k-anonymous secret handshakes with reusable cre-
dentials. In 11th CCS (Washington D.C., USA, 2004), V. Atluri, B. Pfitz-
mann, and P. D. McDaniel (Eds.), ACM, pp. 158–167.
[ZN] Zhang, K., and Needham, R. A private matchmaking protocol.
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/71955.html.
